A  FEW  WORDS 


IN 


VINDICATION    OF    THE    ACTION 


Cntrrt  af  SBisljups, 


CONVENED  AT  CAMDEN,  N.  J., 


SEPTEMBER,  1853. 


by        </ 

ALFRED  LEE, 

BISHOP    OF    THE    DIOCE8E    OF    DELAWARE 


■»»    ^    »■»» 


H.  HOOKER,  CORNER  OF  CHESTNUT  AND  EIGHTH  STREETS. 

1854. 


Entered,  according  to  act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1854,  by 

William  S.  Yocng, 

in  the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania. 


W.   S.  YOUNG,  50  N.  SIXTH  ST.,  PEINTER. 


THE    ACTION 


COURT  OF   BISHOPS. 


The  members  of  the  late  Episcopal  Court  at  Camden  have  not 
evinced  any  particular  anxiety  to  obtrude  themselves  upon  the 
public,  in  defence  of  the  decree  which  was  then  pronounced.     Their 
silence  on  this  subject  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  belief  that  their 
action  met  the  universal  and  unqualified  approval  of  the  Church. 
They  did  not,  it  is  presumed,  expect  at  the  time  that  such  would  be 
the  effect.     They  were  prepared  for  some  degree  of  disappointment 
on  the  part  of  many  who  were  anxiously  watching  their  proceed- 
ings.    And  their  decision  has  been  the  subject,  in  some  quarters,  of 
no  very  friendly  or  flattering  remark.     Neither,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  writer,  is  their  neglect  to  set  forth  more  at  large,  than  in  the 
formal  decree,  the  motives  by  which  they  were  influenced,  to  be 
attributed  to  indifference  as  to  the  opinion  that  might  be  formed 
of  their  action  by  an  enlightened  community,  and  a  deeply  inter- 
ested Church.     Such  indifference  would  ill  become  men  to  whom 
character  is  more  precious  than  aught,  except  the  approval  of  God, 
and  of  their  own  consciences.     To  those  occupying  the  position 
in  which  they  have  been  placed,  it  is  emphatically  true,  that  "a 
good  name  is  better  than  riches."     Their  influence  for  good  is  in- 
separably connected  with  the  confidence  reposed  by  their  fellow- 
men  in  their  integrity  and  purity;  and  they  must,  of  course,  be 
deeply  concerned  that  this  confidence  should  not  be  impaired.     But 
the  writer  would  venture  to  suggest  that  this  silence  is  rather  at- 
tributable to  the  conviction  of  the  members  of  the  Court,  that  the 
matured  and  dispassionate  verdict  of  the  community  would  sustain 
and  confirm  their  conclusion;  that  when  the  difficulties  of  their  po- 
sition were  understood,  and  a  candid  estimate  formed  of  what  would 
have  been  the  probable  results  of  a  difierent  action,  there  would 
be  a  general  sentiment  of  acquiescence  in  their  course,  and  a  jus- 
tification of  their  motives.     They  were  not  so  troubled  with  mis- 
givings as  to  the  propriety  of  their  decree,  as  to  feel  it  necessary 
to  hasten  before  the  public  witli  explanations  and  vindications. 
They  were  content  to  wait  the  safer  and  slower  verdict  of  mature 


consideration.  Having  done  what  they  thought  right  and  allowa- 
ble, they  were  satisfied  to  leave  their  action  open  to  the  examina- 
tion of  the  world,  in  the  belief  that  it  would  eventually  be  accep- 
table to  the  great  body  of  the  unprejudiced,  sober-minded  and 
peace-loving  members  of  their  Communion.  They  might,  it  is  hum- 
bly suggested,  count  upon  the  candid  and  kind  consideration  of  their 
brethren  of  the  clergy  and  laity,  and  suppose  that  those  who  had 
known  them,  long  and  intimately,  would  give  them  credit  for  ho- 
nesty, and  purity  of  intention,  until  the  contrary  was  shown.  The 
members  of  the  Court  were  men  of  public  character.  They  had 
been  before  the  community  and  the  Church  for  years,  under  circum- 
stances well-calculated  to  bring  out  their  principles  and  show  what 
manner  of  men  they  were.  A  considerable  number  of  them  had 
been  prominent  in  the  exercise  of  the  discipline  of  the  Church  upon 
brethren  occupying  the  very  highest  ecclesiastical  positions,  and 
had  incurred  thereby  no  small  measure  of  abuse  and  obloquy. 
Their  lot  had  been  cast  for  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years  in  no  peace- 
ful times  for  the  Church;  and,  amid  unwonted  agitations,  they  had 
been  exposed  to  a  somewhat  severe  ordeal  of  faith  and  character. 
Might  they  not  fairly  presume  that  those  who  had  sustained  and 
sympathized  with  them  in  former  conflicts,  would  be  slow  to  attri- 
bute to  them,  in  the  present  case,  forgetfulness  of  their  principles 
or  betrayal  of  their  trust? 

Inasmuch,  moreover,  as  the  decree  of  the  Court  was  unanimous, 
there  was  no  opportunity  furnished  for  stating  the  views  and  grounds 
of  action  of  individual  members,  as  in  the  case  of  divided  judg- 
ment, or  of  dissent  from  the  decision  of  the  majority.  The  Court 
spoke  judicially  by  its  decree.  No  single  judge  had  any  authority 
to  speak  for  the  Court,  and,  inasmuch  as  he  concurred  in  its  action, 
had  no  right  to  put  on  the  record  the  reasons  for  his  own  particu- 
lar concurrence.  Since  the  adjournment  of  the  Court,  no  one  was 
authorized  or  empowered  to  speak  for  his  brethren,  neither  did 
any  Bishop  feel  forward  to  appear  as  the  volunteer  advocate  of  a 
decision  in  which  his  own  share  was  scarcely  one-twentieth.  The 
members  of  the  Court  were  glad  to  return  to  other  and  more  press- 
ing duties.  The  General  Convention,  with  its  absorbing  claims, 
followed  almost  immediately,  and  the  neglected  interests  of  dio- 
ceses and  parishes  have  since  left  them  very  little  of  leisure  or 
thought  for  a  painful  and  unpleasant  subject.  This  is  presumed  to 
be  the  explanation  of  the  silence  of  the  judges  of  that  Court,  in 
reference  to  their  decision.     To  explain  or  vindicate  it  was  not  es- 


pecially  the  business  of  any  of  them,  and  they  were  not  unwilling 
to  dismiss  from  their  minds  a  matter  that  had  always  been  unwel- 
come. Nor  were  they  greatly  disquieted  as  to  the  opinion  which 
the  community  generally  would  settle  upon.  Had  they  been  more 
anxious  or  more  doubtful,  they  would  have  been  more  eager  to  de- 
fend themselves  before  the  public.  If  any  of  their  highly-respected 
brethren  of  the  clergy  or  laity  were  disappointed  or  dissatisfied, 
it  was  of  course  to  them  a  subject  of  regret,  but  they  relied,  some- 
what confidently,  upon  the  subsidence  of  excitement  and  more  de- 
liberate consideration. 

The  question  may  be  very  promptly  determined  by  an  individual 
invested  with  no  especial  responsibility,  and  not  chargeable  with 
any  of  the  consequences  of  a  decision,  that  the  Court  should  at  once 
have  proceeded  to  a  trial,  or  that,  in  the  event  of  a  majority  de- 
ciding not  to  proceed,  the  minority  should  have  protested  to  the  last 
against  such  a  decision.  But  as  the  question  was  presented  to  the 
minds  of  the  appointed  judges,  upon  whom  lay  the  whole  burden 
of  accountability,  and  who  could  not  but  look  forward  to  the  pro- 
bable results  of  their  procedure,  it  was  exceedingly  grave  and  dif- 
ficult. 

The  writer  of  the  present  statement  was  not  particularly  con- 
cerned in  the  arrangement  of  the  case  which  was  effected  at  Cam- 
den. Having  been  one  of  the  Court  at  Burlington,  and  having  put 
on  the  record  the  reasons  of  his  dissent  from  the  decree  then  pro- 
nounced, he  was  not  placed  upon  the  committee  who  digested  and 
proposed  to  the  recent  Court  the  preamble  and  orders  which  they 
adopted.  His  position  at  Camden  was  rather  that  of  an  acquies- 
cent than  an  actor.  But  he  is  not  disposed  on  this  account  to  shrink 
from  his  full  and  proper  share  of  responsibility.  lie  has  always 
recognised  the  principle  that  the  official  conduct  of  the  Bishops  of 
the  Church  is  open  to  the  freest  examination.  They  ought  to  sanc- 
tion nothing  which  they  are  not  prepared  to  maintain.  And  when 
they  are  misapprehended  or  misrepresented  upon  matters  of  im- 
portance and  general  interest,  they  ought  with  candor  to  state  the 
motives  which  influenced  their  own  conduct,  whether  those  mo. 
tives  do  or  do  not  commend  themselves  to  all  to  whom  they  may  be 
submitted.  He  had  hoped  that  some  of  his  brethren,  more  com- 
petent than  himself  to  present  the  subject,  and  who  might  have 
appended  to  it  names  of  greater  weight,  would  have  addressed  the 
Church.  But  this  not  having  been  done,  he  feels  it  due  to  himself 
to  make  public  the  views  of  the  case  upon  which  he  individually 
acted. 


6 

The  Court  was  influenced  in  the  final  decision  of  the  case  by 
various  considerations,  recited  in  the  preamble  of  their  order  dis- 
missing the  presentment.  Some  of  these  reasons  weighed  more 
forcibly  upon  one  mind,  and  others  upon  another;  but  all  combined 
produced  convictions  so  strong  as  to  lead  to  the  unexpected  and 
remarkable  result  of  an  unanimous  action. 

The  first  considerations  referred  to  in  the  preamble  are  "serious 
embarrassments  thrown  in  the  way  of  the  action  of  this  Court — 
first,  by  the  postponement  of  the  trial  of  the  original  presentment, 
and  afterwards  by  the  decree  and  orders  of  the  Court  of  Bishops, 
assembled  in  October,  1852."     The  ordinary  course  of  judicial 
action  had  become  embarrassed,  in  the  first  place,  by  the  postpone- 
ment of  the  time  of  trial  by  the  late  venerable  Bishop  Chase.     This 
proceeding,  however  well  intended  by  that  respected  and  lamented 
father  in  our  Church,  was  wholly  unwarranted  and  uncanonical,  and 
gave  rise  to  difficulties  from  which  the  case  was  never  afterwards 
relieved.     On  this  account  the  presenting  Bishops  made  a  second 
presentment  of  the  Bishop  of  New  Jersey,  thus  virtually  super- 
seding the  first.     When  the  court  met  in  1852,  it  was  urged,  on 
the  part  of  the  Respondent,  that  the  action  of  the  Convention  of 
New  Jersey  was  prior  to  that  of  the  three  Bishops,  inasmuch  as  it 
anticipated  the  date  of  the  second  presentment.     The  Court  at 
Burlington,  consisting  of  but  fourteen  Bishops,  (many  others  having 
been  prevented  from  attending  by  the  postponement  of  the  trial,) 
sustained,  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  six,  the  objection  thus  made,  and, 
by  certain  orders,  which  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  recapitulate, 
acquiesced  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Convention  of  New  Jersey,  re- 
specting many  of  the  specifications,  and  referred  the  ascertainment  of 
the  fact,  whether  there  was  or  was  not  ground  for  presentment  in 
the  remaining  charges,  to  the  same  Convention.    The  committees 
appointed  by  that  Convention  subsequently  reported  that  such 
grounds  did  not  exist,  and  the  Convention  accepted  and  sanctioned 
their  report.     When  the  Court  assembled,  in  September  last,  the 
decision  of  the  previous  Court,  and  the  consequent  action  of  the 
Convention  of  New  Jersey,  were  pleaded,  in  fact  if  not  in  form,  as 
a  bar  to  the  presentment,  inasmuch  as  the  charges,  contained  in  the 
third  presentment,  were  virtually  the  same  as  those  embraced  in 
the  second.     Upon  the  validity  of  this  argument,  the  Court  evi- 
dently was  greatly  divided.    The  opinion  of  the  six  judges  who 
formed  the  minority  of  the  former  Court  was,  it  is  presumed,  un- 
changed as  to  the  decision  made  in  October,  1852.    They  had  seen 


no  reason  to  vary  their  views  of  the  nature  of  that  decision,  or  to 
modify  in  any  manner  the  dissent  which  they  expressed  at  the  time. 
Had  precisely  the  same  question  been  again  presented,  they  would 
have  given  the  same  answer.  But  the  question  was  not  now  the 
same;  it  was  materially  changed.  Here  was  a  decision  of  a  Court 
of  competent  jurisdiction,  (of  the  same  canonical  tribunal,  in  fact,) 
pleaded  by  the  Respondent.  If  under  that  decision  he  had  acquired 
any  rights,  although  the  decision  itself  might  be  erroneous,  he 
might  with  reason  claim  that  those  rights  be  respected.  It  was 
strongly  urged  that  the  effect  of  that  decision,  indicating  to  the 
Respondent  and  his  diocese  a  certain  line  of  conduct,  and  of  their 
procedure  consequent  thereupon,  was  and  ought  to  be  held  as  a 
final  disposition  of  the  case,  and  that  the  Respondent  could  not  be 
again  put  in  jeopardy  upon  the  same  charges.  It  was  in  effect  as 
if  the  very  Court,  which  had  made  the  previous  order,  were  called 
upon  to  regard  its  own  action,  and  respect  concessions  which  it  had 
itself  granted. 

Upon  the  weight  to  be  given  to  this  objection,  there  was,  as  be- 
fore remarked,  a  considerable  diversity  of  opinion  in  the  minds  of 
members  of  the  Court.  A  number  of  the  judges  appeared  prepared 
to  sustain  it.  Others,  among  whom  was  the  writer  of  this  state- 
ment, had  it  been  brought  to  a  vote,  would  have  overruled  it.  Yet 
even  they  could  not  but  feel,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  the  force 
of  the  objection.  The  fact  that  it  appeared  so  weighty  to  many  of 
their  brethren,  and  especially  to  those  among  them  who  had  not 
been  present  at  the  former  proceeding,  and  were  wholly  uncom- 
mitted thereto,  could  not  but  have  its  influence  with  them.  To 
proceed  to  so  important  and  responsible  an  act  as  the  trial,  in  the 
face  of  grave  objections,  felt  to  some  extent  by  all  the  Court,  and 
by  many  deemed  insuperable,  could  not  but  be  contemplated  with 
the  utmost  reluctance.  So  serious  a  matter  as  the  possible  result 
of  a  trial,  the  taking  away  from  a  Bishop  of  the  Church,  and  one 
strongly  sustained  by  his  own  diocese,  of  his  office,  character,  means 
of  usefulness,  and  support,  required  the  way  to  be  plain  and  unob- 
structed. The  Episcopal  Court  then  assembled  was,  under  the  ex- 
isting law  of  the  church,  a  Court  without  appeal.  If  it  erred  in  its 
procedure  or  decision,  there  were  no  means  provided  of  rectifying 
the  error,  or  remedying  the  evils  that  might  ensue.  The  conse- 
quences of  their  action  would  be  fixed  and  irremediable.  It  was 
of  the  greatest  moment  that  the  verdict  and  sentence  of  the  Court, 
if  such  should  be  rendered  and  pronounced,  should  be  liable  to  no 


8 

just  exception,  before  the  Church,  or  the  tribunals  of  civil  justice. 
That  it  would  be  subjected  to  the  most  searching  examination  was 
palpable.  The  Court  must  be  prepared  to  abide  their  decision  be- 
fore the  civil  tribunals,  if  questions,  resulting  therefrom,  should 
become  the  subject  of  litigation,  as  well  as  before  the  Church,  of 
which  they  were  members  and  pastors.  The  gravity  of  the  diffi- 
culties thus  interposed  was  so  deeply  felt,  that  a  proposition  was 
introduced,  on  the  eleventh  day  of  the  session,  that  the  case  be 
stated,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  and  laid  before  three  of  the 
most  eminent  jurists  of  the  land,  for  their  opinion  on  the  legal 
objections  that  had  been  raised.  The  discussion  of  this  proposition 
occupied  the  greater  part  of  the  day ;  but  before  a  vote  was  taken 
thereupon,  a  substitute  was  proposed,  and  adopted  by  the  Court,  as 
follows: 

"  Ordered,  that  Bishops  Brownell,  Otey,  Polk,  Elliott,  Freeman, 
Williams,  Wainwright,  (being  the  Bishops  who  were  not  members 
of  the  Court  assembled  in  October  last  for  the  trial  of  Bishop 
Doane,)  be  a  committee  to  confer  with  impartial  counsel,  learned 
in  the  law,  how  far  the  action  of  the  Court  then  held  ought  to  in- 
fluence and  control  our  present  decisions,  and  also  to  confer  with 
the  presenting  Bishops  and  Kespondent,  to  ascertain  whether  they 
cannot  come  to  some  understanding  which  shall  be  mutually  satis- 
factory, and  also  fully  answer  the  purposes  of  justice ;  and  that,  in 
order  to  give  them  opportunity  to  discharge  this  duty  and  pre 
pare  a  report,  this  Court  does  now  adjourn  until  Thursday  next." 

The  object  of  this  action  was  twofold — first,  to  obtain  that  aid 
from  legal  science  which  might  assist  the  Court  in  coming  to  a  right 
conclusion  upon  the  question  then  before  them;  secondly,  to  ascer- 
tain, by  conference  with  the  presenting  Bishops  and  Respondent, 
whether  an  understanding  might  be  arrived  at  which  would  satis- 
factorily terminate  the  case.  It  is  humbly  submitted  that  this  step 
was,  under  the  circumstances,  wise  and  justifiable.  It  discovered 
the  difficulties  under  which  the  court  labored,  and  their  desire  to 
effect,  if  possible,  their  removal.  It  showed  a  disinclination  on 
their  part  to  precipitate  action,  or  recklessly  to  disregard  the  real 
obstacles  in  their  way. 

In  the  view  of  the  undersigned,  the  main  bearing  of  the  latter 
clause  of  the  order  was  to  discover  if  any  acknowledgment  of  mis- 
conduct could  be  obtained  from  the  Respondent,  that  would  satisfy 
the  minds  of  the  presenting  Bishops,  and  enable  them,  consistently 
with  their  views  of  duty,  to  withdraw  the  prosecution.     It  has  been 


said  that  this  was  an  extraordinary  step  on  the  part  of  judges.  It 
cannot  be  claimed  that  it  was  strictly  a  judicial  act.  But  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  judges  were  not  an  ordinary  civil  tribunal, 
deciding  an  e very-day  case  of  property  or  wrong.  They  were  also 
members  and  pastors  of  the  Church  of  Christ.  They  were  deeply 
interested,  as  every  member  of  the  Church  must  always  be,  in  its 
harmony  and  peace.  They  were  placed  in  a  position  to  feel,  more 
keenly  and  painfully  than  others,  the  evils  that  ensue  from  discord 
and  division.  They  foresaw,  as  the  result  of  a  trial,  a  fearful 
prospect  of  strife  and  bitterness;  the  Church  distracted,  for  years, 
with  a  conflict  of  the  most  irritating  personal  character;  and  a 
flame  of  discord  kindled  that  would  not  speedily  be  quenched.  It 
was  apparent  that  the  Court  could  not  go  into  a  trial  of  the  case 
with  any  thing  like  unanimity — nay,  that  such  a  step  could  be  car- 
ried, if  at  all,  by  a  majority  exceedingly  small.  A  trial  nnder  such 
circumstances,  and  before  a  Court  destitute  of  the  powers  of  civil 
tribunals,  would  be  clogged  at  every  step  with  great  impediments, 
and  little  satisfaction  could  be  expected  as  the  result.  It  was  very 
painful  to  contemplate  a  verdict  of  condemnation  or  acquittal 
passed  by  a  bare  majority.  Diversity  of  opinion  among  the  judges 
would  greatly  detract  from  the  moral  weight  of  the  decision.  And 
if  it  could  be  alleged  that  the  variance  of  opinion,  on  the  merits 
of  the  case,  corresponded  with  their  respective  opinions  on  theolo- 
gical and  ecclesiastical  points,  then  a  most  plausible  pretext  would 
be  furnished  for  the  dissatisfied  to  impute  the  decision  to  party 
preferences  and  associations.  Recent  painful  experience  had 
plainly  shown  the  certainty  of  such  a  result,  as  well  as  its  unhappy 
consequences  upon  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  our  Church. 

Such  then  was  apparently  the  prospect  in  the  alternative  of  a 
trial — a  Court  divided  in  its  inception  and  progress,  a  constant  and 
desperate  struggle  as  it  proceeded,  a  greatly  divided  verdict,  a  re- 
sult wanting  in  moral  force,  and  liable,  whether  justly  or  unjustly, 
to  the  imputation  of  being  influenced  by  party  feeling — and,  be- 
yond that,  a  most  harassing  and  interminable  conflict,  agitating 
and  convulsing  the  Church,  and,  not  improbably,  making  its  gene- 
ral and  diocesan  Conventions  arenas  of  embittered  contention.  It 
is  not  claimed  that  these  and  similar  considerations  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  warrant  a  Court  in  refusing  to  try  a  case,  when  no  other 
reasonable  objections  could  be  urged  against  proceeding,  and  the 
trial  was  demanded  by  the  prosecutors.  In  the  reasons  for  his 
dissent  from  the  Burlington  decision,  the  undersigned  stated  his 
2 


10 

decided  conviction  that  the  apprehended  consequences  of  a  trial 
would  not  justify  a  Court  in  refusing  to  proceed;  and  he  has  no 
wish  to  retract  any  argument  or  opinion  there  expressed.  But  in 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case  before  them,  encountered 
by  the  serious  obstacle  of  the  former  decree,  he  did  and  does  con- 
ceive it  justifiable  for  the  Court  to  pause,  and  inquire  whether  these 
foreseen  evils  were  inevitable.  Must  the  Church  be  so  deeply 
afflicted  for  years  to  come?  Must  it  be  exposed  to  the  hazard  of 
being  rent  in  pieces  by  internal  dissensions?  Must  its  future  be 
one  of  division  and  discord,  brother  arrayed  against  brother,  and 
Bishop  against  Bishop,  in  fraternal  strife?  If  the  Respondent  could 
be  induced  to  make  a  candid  acknowledgment  of  those  faults  which 
had  given  occasion  to  this  prosecution,  the  presenting  Bishops  might 
feel  themselves  at  liberty  to  withdraw  their  presentment.  In  this 
way  the  honor  of  the  Church  might  be  vindicated,  and  its  peace 
preserved.  Yet  it  was  perhaps  too  much  to  expect  from  persons 
in  their  position,  charged  as  public  prosecutors  with  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  laws  of  the  Church,  having  taken  so  public  a  stand  as 
accusers,  desirous  to  bring  forward  their  proofs  and  evidence, 
having  been  exposed  to  much  unjust  obloquy  in  the  conscientious 
discharge  of  what  they  deemed  a  painful  duty — it  was  probably 
too  much  to  expect  that  they  should  consent  to  such  a  withdrawal. 
The  committee  reported,  accordingly,  that  "  they  found  that  no  un- 
derstanding could  be  come  to  of  the  sort  contemplated  in  the  order 
of  the  Court,  the  presenting  Bishops  feeling  themselves  unable  to 
withdraw  their  presentment,  under  any  such  acknowledgment  of 
error  as  the  Respondent  would  be  willing  to  make."  They  go  on, 
however,  to  state  that  "  they  conferred  with  the  Respondent,  who 
expressed  himself  quite  ready  to  acknowledge,  as  he  had  already 
done  to  some  extent  in  open  Court,  such  error  as  his  conscience 
accused  him  of,"  the  result  of  which  conference  the  committee  had 
u  embodied  in  the  preamble  and  orders  which  they  submitted  as  the 
basis  of  a  settlement  of  this  vexed  and  painful  question." 

The  most  important  feature  of  the  report  of  this  committee,  and 
that  which  principally  led  to  the  result,  was  the  acknowledgment 
made  by  the  Respondent,  as  follows: 

"  The  undersigned,  in  prosecuting  his  plans  of  Christian  education,  in  connex- 
ion with  St.  Mary's  Hall  and  Burlington  College,  found  that  the  expenses  of  the 
•enterprise  greatly  exceeded  his  calculations;  while  the  assistance,  on  which  he 
had  confidently  relied,  perhaps  too  sanguinely,  fell  altogether  short  of  what  he 
deemed  his  reasonable  expectations.     In  this  condition  of  things,  being  en- 


11 

tirely  left  alone,  and  without  advice,  every  step  which  he  advanced  involved 
him  more  and  more  deeply  in  pecuniary  embarrassments.  He  admits  that  he 
made  representations  which,  at  the  time,  he  believed  to  be  correct,  but  many 
of  which  turned  out  in  the  event  to  be  erroneous.  He  was  also  led,  by  his  too 
confident  reliance  on  anticipated  aid,  to  make  promises  which  he  fully  ex- 
pected to  perform;  but  which,  experience  has  taught  him,  were  far  too  strongly 
expressed.  He  was  also  induced,  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  money  to  meet  his 
necessities,  to  resort  to  methods,  by  the  payment  of  exorbitant  interest  on  loans, 
which  he  did  not  suppose  were  in  contravention  of  the  law,  and  which  common 
usage  seemed  to  him  to  justify.  He  also,  in  entire  confidence  in  his  ability  to 
replace  them,  made  use  of  certain  trust  funds,  in  a  way  which  he  deeply  re- 
grets, and,  although  they  have  long  been  perfectly  secured,  does  not  now  jus- 
tify. 

The  embarrassments  here  referred  to  were  followed  by  a  long  and  well  nigh 
fatal  illness,  which,  withdrawing  him  entirely  from  the  business  which  he  had 
carried  on  alone,  was  mainly  instrumental  in  the  entire  failure  of  his  pecuniary 
aflairs.  The  perplexity  arising  from  this  failure,  with  the  protracted  infirmity 
which  followed  his  sickness,  made  him  liable  to  many  errors  and  mistakes 
which  might  easily  bear  the  appearance  of  intentional  misrepresentations.  In 
connexion  with  the  assignment  of  his  property,  he  set  his  name  under  oath  to  an 
inventory  of  his  goods,  and  also  to  a  list  of  his  debts,  which  he  believed  to  be 
correct — an  act  which,  he  grieves  to  find,  has  given  rise  to  an  impression  in  the 
minds  of  some  that  he  exhibited  an  insensibility  to  the  awful  sanctions  of  the 
oath  of  a  Christian  man.  But,  while  he  laments  the  impression,  he  declares 
that  this  act  was  only  done  under  legal  advice,  and  in  firm  conviction  of  its  cor- 
rectness. 

Some  time  after  his  recovery  from  the  illness  above  alluded  to,  but  while  he 
was  still  in  the  midst  of  his  perplexities,  smarting  under  his  heavy  disappoint- 
ments, and  wounded  by  the  imputations  to  which  in  some  quarters  he  was  sub- 
jected, the  letter  of  the  three  Bishops  came  to  him.  He  has  no  disposition  to 
ascribe  to  them  any  other  than  just  and  proper  motives  in  thus  addressing  him. 
But,  at  the  time  when  he  received  the  communication,  he  viewed  it  otherwise, 
and  under  the  strong  excitement  of  the  moment  penned  a  pamphlet,  parts  of 
which  he  does  not  now  justify,  and  expressions  in  which,  in  regard  to  those 
brethren,  he  deeply  regrets. 

In  reference  to  his  indebtedness,  he  now  renews  the  declaration  of  intention 
which  he  has  constantly  made,  and  has  acted  on  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability  thus 
far,  to  devote  his  means,  efforts,  and  influence,  in  dependence  upon  God's  bless- 
ing, to  the  payment,  principal  and  interest,  of  every  just  demand  against  him, 
an  expectation  which  there  is  reasonable  hope  of  having  fulfilled,  since  a  com- 
mittee of  the  trustees  and  friends  of  Burlington  College,  by  whom  both  institu- 
tions are  now  carried  on,  have  undertaken  an  enterprise,  which  is  nearly  com- 
pleted, to  discharge  the  whole  of  the  mortgage  debt,  and  thus  secure  the  pro- 
perty at  Riverside  and  St.  Mary's  Hall,  with  that  of  Burlington  College,  to  the 
Church  forever  for  the  purpose  of  Christian  education.  And  this  done,  the 
trustees  have  further  agreed  to  appropriate  during  his  life  the  surplus  income  of 
both  institutions  to  the  liquidation  of  all  his  other  debts  in  carrying  on  the  said 
institutions. 


12 

That  in  the  course  of  all  these  transactions  human  infirmity  may  have  led 
him  into  many  errors  he  deeply  feels.  He  does  not  wish  to  justify  or  excuse 
them.  If  scandal  to  the  Church,  or  injury  to  the  cause  of  Christ,  have  arisen 
from  them,  they  are  occasion  to  him  of  mortification  and  regret.  For  these 
things,  in  all  humility  and  sorrow,  before  God  and  man,  he  has  always  felt  him- 
self liable  to,  and  willing  to  receive,  the  friendly  reproofs  of  his  brethren  in  Christ 
Jesas,  and  especially  of  the  Bishops  of  this  Church. 

G.  W.  Doane. 
Bishop  of  New  Jersey." 


The  reading  of  this  paper  produced  upon  the  Court  a  marked  and 
favorable  impression.  If  their  accused  brother  were  willing,  in 
the  spirit  of  penitence,  to  confess  his  faults,  and  make  reparation 
to  those  who  had  suffered  by  them,  might  not  his  judges,  as  Chris- 
tian brethren  and  Bishops,  respond  to  this  appeal  in  kindness  and 
forbearance?  Upon  this  statement  the  Court  was  disposed  to  put 
a  candid  and  generous  construction.  It  purported  to  be  an  acknow- 
ledgment by  the  Respondent  of  "  such  error  as  his  conscience  ac- 
cused him  of."  As  such  the  Court  received  it.  No  minute  com- 
parison was  instituted  between  the  several  particulars  of  the  ac- 
knowledgment, and  the  various  specifications  of  the  presentment. 
The  Court  did  not  inquire  to  what  extent  each  particular  of  the 
accusation  was  noticed  in  the  admission.  They  took  it  as  a  whole, 
and  acted  upon  it  as  a  sincere  and  candid  representation  of  Bishop 
Doane's  own  convictions  of  past  error  and  misconduct.  A  ray  of 
cheering  light  broke  upon  them  through  the  hitherto  dark  and 
lowering  sky,  and  they  feared  to  extinguish  it. 

The  Court  felt  that  the  above  was  a  large  and  painful  admission 
for  the  Respondent  to  have  made.  Some  of  the  acts  charged 
against  him  it  acknowledged.  It  was  accompanied,  indeed,  with 
a  denial  on  the  part  of  the  Respondent  of  intentional  fraud.  It 
stated  such  exculpatory  considerations  as  seemed  to  him  at  the 
time  to  excuse  his  conduct.  It  dwelt  upon  the  various  difficulties 
which  he  had  encountered  in  his  extensive  educational  plans,  from 
the  failure  of  others  to  fulfil  expectations  which  ho  deemed  rea- 
sonable, and  assurances  in  which  he  had  placed  confidence,  and 
from  the  breaking  down  of  his  own  health  in  the  height  of  his  em- 
barrassments. 

But  would  it  have  been  the  part  of  equity  and  Christian  kind- 
ness in  the  Court  to  have  refused  him  permission  to  adduce,  in  con- 
nexion with  this  mortifying  acknowledgment,  any  mitigating  cir- 
cumstances?    Must  they  decline  to  listen  to  any  suggestions  that 


13 

seemed  to  extenuate  the  acts  charged  against  him?  The  main 
thing,  indeed,  in  this  paper,  was  his  admission  of  certain  facts. 
All  that  could  be  proved  by  evidence  adduced  to  any  specification 
would  be  the  fact  charged  in  that  specification.  But  the  degree 
of  blame  and  criminality  involved  in  a  particular  act  would  de- 
pend, in  foro  conscientice,  on  many  circumstances,  and  very  ma- 
terially on  the  intentions  with  which  it  was  committed.  The  same 
act  might  be  an  imprudence  or  a  crime,  according  to  the  intent  of 
the  actor.  In  the  opinion  of  the  writer  at  the  time,  the  paper 
subscribed  by  Bishop  Doane  was  equivalent  to  a  plea  df  guilty, 
as  to  several  charges  in  the  presentment.  But  the  Court,  in  re- 
ceiving this  acknowledgment,  could  not  refuse  the  Respondent  the 
benefit  of  stating  such  considerations  as  he  might  wish  to  urge  in 
palliation  of  his  conduct.  The  Respondent  was  not  willing  to  plead 
guilty,  nakedly  and  unqualifiedly.  He  was  ready  to  admit  the 
truth  of  certain  acts  complained  of,  but  he  claimed  the  privilege, 
in  so  doing,  to  represent  his  own  views  and  intentions,  and  to  dis- 
avow criminal  purposes  and  fraudulent  designs.  How  far  these 
acts  were  excused  by  the  attendant  circumstances,  is  a  question 
upon  which  the  opinion  of  many  others  might  vary  from  his  own. 
But  certainly  it  would  have  been  a  hard  thing  for  the  Court  to  have 
refused  to  listen  to  them,  or  to  have  declined  to  allow  them  any 
weight  whatever  in  their  own  estimate  of  the  matters  confessed. 

In  this  paper,  the  Respondent  also  expressed  his  regret  for  harsh 
expressions,  in  reference  to  the  course  of  the  presenting  Bishops, 
which  had  been  published  in  his  pamphlet,  penned  at  the  time  of 
receiving  their  first  communication,  under  strong  excitement,  and 
disclaimed  any  present  disposition  to  impute  to  them  other  than 
just  and  proper  motives  in  thus  addressing  him. 

He  declared  his  intention  to  devote  his  means,  efforts,  and  influ- 
ence, in  dependence  upon  God's  blessing,  to  the  payment,  principal 
and  interest,  of  every  just  demand  against  him,  and  referred  to  a 
plan  then  on  foot  for  raising  a  large  sum  of  money,  as  furnishing 
reasonable  hope  of  fulfilling  this  purpose. 

He  moreover  disclaimed  the  wish  to  justify  or  excuse  any  errors 
into  which  he  might  have  been  led.  "  If  scandal  to  the  Church  and 
injury  to  the  cause  of  Christ  have  arisen  from  them,  they  are  oc- 
casion to  him  of  mortification  and  regret.  For  these  things,  in  all 
humility  and  sorrow,  before  God  and  man,  he  has  always  felt  him- 
self liable  to,  and  willing  to  receive,  the  friendly  reproofs  of  his 
brethren  in  Christ  Jesus,  and  especially,  the  Bishops  of  the  Church." 


14 

In  this  paper,  then,  was  laid  before  the  Court  an  admission  of 
certain  acts  of  misconduct  charged  against  the  Respondent.  And 
this  admission  was  accompanied  with  expressions  of  humility,  sor- 
row and  regret.  The  introduction  of  exculpatory  considerations 
does  not  affect  these  important  points.  To  the  latter  the  Court 
might  attach  what  weight  they  considered  them  entitled  to,  and 
the  Church  and  the  community  at  large  will  do  the  same.  But  to 
argue  that  they  invalidate  the  acknowledgment  to  which  they  are 
appended,  and  therefore  render  it  an  insufficient  basis  for  the  action 
of  the  Court,  is  wholly  unreasonable.  The  facts  are  one  thing — 
the  qualifying  considerations  are  another.  The  Court,  by  exami- 
nation of  witnesses,  could  only  arrive  at  the  facts.  But,  even  if 
proved,  the  Respondent  would  not  be  precluded  from  urging  in 
defence  any  thing  that  could  go  to  palliate  or  excuse  his  conduct; 
and  all  such  arguments  would  have  their  weight,  even  in  case  of 
conviction,  in  determining  the  sentence. 

When  the  above  report  of  the  committee  was  laid  before  the 
Court,  the  presenting  Bishops  claimed  the  right  of  making  an  ar- 
gument against  the  adoption  of  its  recommendations.  But,  after  a 
somewhat  protracted  private  conference  with  the  committee,  they 
waived  this  right,  and  presented  that  statement  of  their  legal  po- 
sition which  is  published  in  the  record  of  the  Court.  This  waiver 
was  not  without  effect — more,  perhaps,  than  they  themselves  meant 
or  apprehended. 

The  report  and  orders  proposed  were  then  adopted  by  an  unani- 
mous vote. 

Doubtless  different  members  of  the  Court  were  actuated  by  dif- 
ferent motives  in  coming  to  this  conclusion.  It  was  not  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  case  which  many  or  most  of  the  judges  would  have 
preferred.  It  was  open  to  opposite  objections  from  those,  respec- 
tively, who  had  taken  opposite  views  during  the  previous  history  of 
the  case.  It  was  the  result  of  mutual  concession,  and  the  expres- 
sion of  the  very  earnest  desire  of  all  the  Bishops  to  maintain,  if 
possible  without  the  sacrifice  of  principle,  the  oneness  and  harmony 
of  the  Church,  and  to  set  forwards,  as  much  as  in  them  lay,  quiet- 
ness, peace  and  love  among  Christian  people,  and  especially  among 
those  committed  to  their  charge.  As  one  concurring  in  this  action, 
and  willing  to  bear  my  proper  share  of  the  responsibility  attach- 
ing thereto,  I  was  influenced  in  the  final  vote  by  the  following  con- 
siderations: 

1.  The  necessity  was  thus  avoided  of  deciding  upon  the  ques- 


15 

tion  of  the  degree  of  Weight  to  be  attached  to  the  action  of  the 
Court  held  in  October,  1852.  For  the  present  Court  to  have  un- 
qualifiedly confirmed  that  decision  would  have  been  to  my  mind  a 
very  lamentable  thing.  It  would  have  sanctioned  a  contravention 
of  the  law  of  1844,  a  virtual  denial  of  justice,  a  nullification  of 
rights  granted  to  the  Bishops,  a  prostration  of  the  judicial  autho- 
rity of  the  Church  at  the  feet  of  a  diocesan  Convention,  a  heavy 
blow  struck  at  our  present  orderly  and  beautiful  confederation,  at 
our  oneness,  strength  and  discipline  as  a  national  Church. 

Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  to  have  so  overruled  it  as  to  disregard 
wholly  its  effect  upon  the  position  of  the  Respondent,  might  havo 
appeared  like  a  disregard  of  the  plighted  faith  of  the  Church,  as 
represented  by  the  former  Court,  and  the  infringement  of  a  privi- 
lege then  conveyed  to  him  by  a  solemn  decision.  Be  it  that  the 
decision  itself  was. erroneous;  does  that  conclusion  quite  invalidate 
the  Respondent's  claim  that  the  privileges  which  it  had  given  him 
should  be  respected?  He  and  his  Convention  had  complied  with 
the  terms  of  that  decree.  They  came  before  the  Court  to  present 
the  result  of  an  inquiry  which  the  previous  Court  had  ordered  and 
sanctioned.  Now  shall  the  present  Court  wholly  ignore  or  disavow 
the  action  of  the  former?  Shall  it  not  merely  repudiate  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  decision,  but  go  on  and  strip  the  Respondent  of  any 
benefit  that  had  enured  to  him  from  such  decision?  The  Respond- 
ent comes  before  the  same  tribunal,  the  Bishops  of  the  Protestant 
Episcopal  Church.  He  argues:  'Relying  upon  your  former  deci- 
sion, I  have  acted  as  you  prescribed.  Here  is  the  evidence  of  my 
conformity  to  your  directions.  Let  me  not  be  the  sufferer.  The 
responsibility  of  that  decision  was  yours,  and  not  mine;  and  since 
I  have  conformed  thereto,  I  claim  that  you  cannot  disregard  it.' 

Now  it  would  be  indeed  a  blot  upon  the  fair  fame  of  the  Church, 
if  she  should  appear  indifferent  to  the  sacredness  of  her  plighted 
faith.  It  would  be  a  sad  reproach,  if  no  confidence  could  be  re- 
posed in  her  decisions,  and  the  most  precious  rights  of  her  minis- 
ters might  be  placed  at  the  mercy  of  an  accidental  majority. 

For  the  interests  of  truth  and  justice,  indeed,  it  is  important  that 
the  principle  of  an  erroneous  decision  should  not  be  permanently 
established.  But,  in  doing  this,  it  is  not  less  important  that  no 
just  imputation  should  attach  to  the  highest  judicial  tribunal  of 
the  Church,  of  forfeiting  its  own  pledges,  and  taking  back  to-day 
what  it  had  given  yesterday.  The  decision  of  the  court  at  Camden 
avoided  each  alternative  of  this  dilemma.     The  former  action  was 


16 

overruled,  so  far  as  it  was  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  law. 
The  correct  principle  was  established,  that  a  diocesan  Convention 
cannot  properly  claim  to  interpose  between  presenting  Bishops, 
exercising  their  canonical  right,  and  the  appointed  tribunal.  Thus 
the  administration  of  justice  in  the  Church  was  guarded  against 
future  interruption  on  account  of  the  precedent  of  the  decree  of 
October,  1852.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  no  withdrawal  from 
Bishop  Doane  of  any  right  that  he  might  possibly  have  acquired 
under  that  decree.  The  decision  of  the  former  Court,  so  far  as 
legal  principle  was  concerned,  was  overruled ;  so  far  as  the  Re- 
spondent was  individually  interested,  its  concessions  were  not  re- 
tracted or  violated. 

2.  My  concurrence  in  the  decision  at  Camden  was  mainly  secured 
by  the  acknowledgments  of  Bishop  Doane  above  recited,  and  the 
expressions  of  regret  and  sorrow  for  the  past  with  which  they  were 
accompanied.  In  this  statement  I  was  willing  to  repose  confi- 
dence, to  receive  it  as  an  act  of  reparation  and  contrition,  and  to 
afford  a  brother,  to  whom  the  large  majority  of  his  diocese  ap- 
peared to  cling  with  unwavering  confidence  and  affection,  the  full- 
est opportunity  of  retrieving  his  errors,  and  regaining  the  confi- 
dence of  the  Church  at  large. 

3.  It  is  a  well-known  maxim  of  law  that,  where  there  is  reasona- 
ble doubt  on  the  mind  of  a  juror,  in  a  criminal  case,  the  accused 
is  entitled  to  the  benefit  thereof.  The  case  presented  to  the  court 
at  Camden  was  embarrassed  by  doubts  of  a  grave  and  serious  cha- 
racter. Was  it  not  their  duty  to  give  to  the  Respondent  the  bene- 
fit of  those  doubts?  Finding  great  difficulty  in  deciding  which  was 
the  proper  course  to  pursue,  were  they  not  justified  in  allowing 
this  consideration  to  turn  the  balance? 

4.  They  were  exercising  as  Bishops  the  discipline  of  the  Church 
of  Christ,  and  could  not  forget  the  injunction  in  the  consecration 
office:  "Be  so  merciful,  that  ye  be  not  too  remiss;  so  minister  dis- 
cipline, that  ye  forget  not  mercy.11  Neither  could  they  shut  out 
from  their  minds  the  still  more  sacred  injunctions  of  Holy  Writ  of 
the  same  tenor:  "Brethren,  if  a  man  be  overtaken  with  a  fault,  ye, 
which  are  spiritual,  restore  such  an  one  in  the  spirit  of  meekness, 
considering  thyself  lest  thou  also  be  tempted."  The  Respondent 
urged  very  strongly  upon  his  brethren  of  the  Court  that,  during 
the  years  wherein  these  alleged  acts  of  misconduct  occurred,  the 
rumours  of  which  were  extensively  circulated  in  the  public  prints, 
none  of  them  had  ever  admonished  him  in  private  of  the  scandal 


17 

that  was  said  to  have  been  thereby  caused,  and  the  appeal  was  not 
unfelt. 

5.  With  regard  to  the  alleged  violation  of  law,  by  an  extra-ju- 
dicial proceeding,  it  is  submitted,  that  there  may  reasonably  be 
conceded,  to  an  ecclesiastical  (I  do  not  say  an  episcopal)  Court,  a 
measure  of  discretion  beyond  that  ordinarily  exercised  by  civil 
tribunals.  The  differences  between  the  two  are  great  and  mani- 
fest. The  civil  tribunal  is  composed  of  judges  who  are  entirely 
devoted  to  this  function,  and  who  have  been  trained  for  it  by  a  long 
course  of  previous  study  and  practice.  The  administration  of  jus- 
tice is  the  business  of  their  lives.  They  are  in  constant  session. 
They  have  all  the  light  which  can  be  thrown  upon  disputed  points 
by  the  arguments  of  able  counsel.  They  have  the  assistance  of  a 
jury  to  determine  questions  of  fact.  They  are  sustained  in  their 
proceedings  by  the  whole  power  of  the  State;  can  constrain  the 
attendance  of  witnesses;  compel  them  to  testify,  no  matter  how  re- 
luctant; require  the  production  of  documents;  punish  contempts; 
and  enforce  their  decisions  with  a  strong  hand.  They  have  the  aid 
of  a  vast  amount  of  recognised  principles  and  adjudged  cases  to 
guide  them  to  a  right  conclu6ion- 

Xow  how  entirely  different  the  case  of  an  ecclesiastical  Court ! 
The  judges  are  not  trained  for  such  a  function.  If  any  of  them 
should  chance  to  have  had  a  legal  education,  it  is  accidental,  and 
without  the  view  of  the  church  legislation  constituting  them  judges. 
They  are  not  familiar  with  practice.  Their  assemblage  for  judi- 
cial purposes  is  a  rare  event.  The  time  occupied  for  a  trial  must 
be  taken  from  the  pressing  and  more  congenial  occupations  of  a 
very  different  sphere  of  action.  It  summons  them  to  duties  quite 
foreign  to  their  usual  avocations.  They  are  almost  wholly  desti- 
tute of  precedents  in  their  own  line;  and  to  search  for  them  in  the 
bulky  libraries  of  the  civil  or  common  law,  would  be  as  laborious 
as  unprofitable.  They  have  no  opportunity,  under  our  present  ca- 
non, of  hearing  counsel,  unless  the  accused  choose  to  introduce  them. 
They  are  without  power  to  compel  testimony;  the  witnesses  must 
be  volunteers.  And  if  material  witnesses  are  unwilling  to  testify, 
the  Court  is  powerless.  The  judges  must  decide  the  case  according 
to  the  evidence  brought  before  them  in  Court,  and  yet  the  very  evi- 
dence, indispensable  to  a  right  decision,  may  be  wilfully  withheld. 
And  when  their  decision  is  pronounced,  its  effect  very  much  depends 
upon  its  consonance  with  public  opinion,  since  they  could  with  dif- 
ficulty enforce  a  sentence,  however  just  and  righteous,  if  the  ac- 
3 


18 

cuscd  should  be  contumacious,  and  any  considerable  portion  of  the 
Church  should  sympathize  with  him. 

Such  being  the  comparative  impotence  of  ecclesiastical  tribunals, 
is  it  reasonable  that  they  should  be  subjected  in  their  proceedings 
to  inexorable  necessity  ?  Destitute  of  the  authority  of  civil  courts, 
must  they  be  as  stringently  tied  to  a  prescribed  routine?  Where 
there  is  so  little  power,  should  there  not  be  allowed  more  liberty? 
And  since  cases  may  occur,  wherein,  without  fault  of  theirs,  a  trial 
could  only  result  in  disappointment  and  disaster,  and  the  object 
may  be  otherwise  secured,  may  they  not  be  permitted  to  take  a 
previous  survey  of  the  circumstances  of  a  peculiar  case,  estimate 
the  probability  of  reaching  the  end  proposed,  and  then  determine 
whether  a  trial  should  or  should  not  be  had  ?  No  special  claim  is 
here  made  in  behalf  of  inherent  episcopal  powers.  But  there  is 
claimed  for  every  ecclesiastical  tribunal,  whether  composed  of 
Bishops,  Presbyters,  or  laymen,  some  enlargement  of  discretion  be- 
yond what  would  be  conceded  to  an  ordinary  tribunal.  The  cases 
before  them  will  usually  be  of  a  more  delicate  character,  personal 
rather  than  pecuniary,  affecting  mainly  character,  influence,  repu- 
tation, domestic  peace  and  privacy,  and  the  interests  of  religion, 
and  the  Church  of  Christ.  Publicity  is  far  more  injurious,  scandal 
more  rife,  suspicion  more  alert,  and  calumny  more  censorious. 
The  ascertainment  of  truth  is  indispensable  to  a  correct  decision, 
and  yet  the  means  of  ascertaining  truth  are  restricted  or  denied. 
It  is  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  the  Court  can  procure  the  evi- 
dence on  which  to  base  a  right  decision.  And  if  the  question  be 
one  on  which  the  different  sections  of  the  Church  have  taken  oppo- 
site ground,  then  it  is  morally  certain  that  the  decision,  even  if  it 
be  right,  will  not  satisfy  a  large  proportion  of  those  whom  it  may 
affect.  Now  while  all  these  reasons  do  not  justify  ecclesiastical 
judges  in  shrinking  from  manifest  duty,  they  do,  I  conceive,  entitle 
them  to  a  fuller  latitude  as  to  the  disposal  of  a  case  in  its  different 
stages.  They  may  be,  and  I  think  must  be,  allowed  to  survey  the 
whole  ground  before  them,  contemplate  the  issues  of  their  action 
in  this  or  that  direction,  and  have  some  liberty  of  determining  as 
to  the  expediency  and  necessity  of  a  trial  in  peculiar  and  doubtful 
cases.  Against  the  abuse  of  such  discretion,  there  is,  I  apprehend, 
a  safeguard  in  the  amenability  of  every  such  body  to  the  great  bar 
of  public  opinion,  and  in  the  legislative  authority  of  the  Church. 
The  recent  Court  was  very  solemnly  warned  that  their  own  trial, 
before  the  Church  and  the  community,  would  follow  immediately 


19 

upon  their  decision.  The  temper  of  the  times,  both  within  and 
without  our  Church,  is  any  thing  but  favourable  to  unregulated  or 
arbitrary  authority.  This  is  no  period  for  the  encroachments  and 
graspings  of  undefined  prerogative.  In  his  place  in  the  legislative 
councils  of  the  Church,  the  undersigned  has  always  been  opposed 
to  action  by  the  Bishops  of  the  Protectant  Episcopal  Church  on  the 
ground  of  inherent  powers,  unrecognised  by  express  law.  lie  be- 
lieves that  the  just  influence  of  the  Bishops  will  be  far  better  main- 
tained by  their  scrupulously  confining  themselves  within  prescribed 
legal  limits.  This  principle  was  never  more  strongly  maintained, 
in  both  houses  of  the  General  Convention,  than  during  the  recent 
session.  The  shadowy  claim  of  mere  prerogative  was  effectually 
put  to  flight,  and  there  is  little  ground  for  apprehension  that  it  can 
ever  be  reasserted  with  success.  In  the  jealous  vigilance  that 
watches,  eagle-eyed,  any  reappearance  of  this  unpopular  pretence 
of  inherent  episcopal  right,  there  is  a  sufficient  safeguard  against 
its  encroachments.  And  to  this  corrective  may,  it  is  submitted,  be 
safely  left  the  exercise  of  discretion  by  judicial  tribunals.  If  all 
such  latitude  be  denied  them,  and  they  be  constrained,  while  des- 
titute of  all  the  power  of  secular  judges,  to  pursue  the  same  un- 
deviating  course,  it  may  become  with  many  a  strong  conviction  that 
they  must  decline  altogether  a  duty  so  responsible,  so  ungrateful, 
and  so  impracticable. 

6.  Let  me  be  permitted  to  add  another  word  respecting  an  im- 
putation that  has  been  cast  upon  the  recent  Court,  on  account  of 
their  not  inflicting  any  censure  or  admonition  upon  the  Bishop  of 
New  Jersey,  after  receiving  the  above-mentioned  acknowledg- 
ments. To  infer  from  this  omission  that  the  acts  confessed  were 
not,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  deserving  of  censure,  would  be 
altogether  unwarranted.  The  Respondent  himself  declined  to  jus- 
tify many  of  these  acts,  virtually  admitted  that  scandal  had  thence 
arisen,  and  declared  it  to  be  cause  to  himself  of  mortification  and 
regret.  So  far  as  the  writer  was  concerned,  it  seemed  to  him  that 
a  formal  admonition  would  have  scarcely  added  any  thing  to  the 
burden  which  already  had  pressed  heavily  upon  his  accused  bro- 
ther. If  disappointment,  reproach,  and  anguish  of  mind  be  pun- 
ishment, can  we  say  indeed  that  he  had  not  been  punished?  Is  it 
a  small  thing  for  a  chief  pastor  of  the  Church  to  be  held  up  before 
the  Christian  world  as  a  dishonest  man?  To  be  charged, in  three 
successive  presentments,  with  a  series  of  acts,  appearing  on  the 
face  of  them  fraudulent  and  deceptive  ?     To  have  the  many-tongued 


20 

press  proclaiming  from  Xorth  to  South,  and  from  East  to  West,  his 
alleged  delinquencies?  To  be  arraigned  before  his  peers,  on  two 
occasions,  and  subjected  to  the  immense  sufferings  consequent  upon 
standing  at  their  bar  under  serious  accusations?  To  have  all  his 
pecuniary  transactions,  and  even  the  privacy  of  his  domestic  life, 
exposed  to  the  gaze  of  the  multitude?  And  to  be  constrained  to 
make  at  last  an  acknowledgment  so  unpleasant  and  mortifying? 
May  not  the  Court,  in  disposing  of  the  case,  take  into  view  the 
sharp  mental  agony  that  must  have  been  preying  for  months  and 
years  upon  their  brother?  May  they  not  consider  the  distress  and 
humiliation  to  which  he  has  been  already  subjected?  A  present- 
ment itself  of  a  Christian  minister,  and  especially  of  one  so  con- 
spicuous and  observed  as  a  Bishop;  the  bringing  of  one  invested 
with  the  sacred  office  as  a  criminal  before  a  censorious,  mocking 
world,  is  itself,  however  it  may  terminate,  a  fearful  thing.  What 
would  have  been  the  addition  of  a  judicial  censure  to  one  already 
so  sorely  visited?  That  the  conduct  confessed  was,  to  the  minds 
of  the  Court,  censurable,  no  one  can  doubt.  The  very  requirement 
of  the  acknowledgment  is  evidence  that  they  so  regarded  it.  But 
in  place  of  proceeding  to  a  trial,  they  had  consented  to  receive  this 
acknowledgment.  The  infliction  of  a  canonical  penalty  would  have 
been  extra-judicial  and  unauthorized,  and  might  have  been  open 
to  the  charge  of  being  illegal  and  oppressive.  The  Court  trusted 
that  the  great  end  of  justice  had  been  attained.  And,  inasmuch  as 
the  Respondent  had  been  for  a  long  time  subjected  to  extreme  pain, 
inconvenience,  suffering  and  reproach,  by  reason  of  the  charges 
against  him,  and  the  several  prosecutions  instituted  thereupon, 
might  they  not,  in  the  termination  of  the  case,  act  in  the  spirit  of 
generosity,  and  forbear  to  add  another  burden  to  the  weight  under 
which  he  had  been  almost  crushed? 

7.  And,  finally,  the  undersigned  was  induced  to  concur  witli  his 
brethren  in  the  Court,  by  his  earnest  desire  for  the  restoration  of 
harmony  to  the  Church.  He  was  willing,  for  the  sake  of  peace,  to 
concede  any  thing  but  truth  and  justice,  and  he  acted  under  the 
impression  that  the  concession  required  fell  short  of  such  a  sacri- 
fice. That  the  desired  result  did  flow  from  the  conciliatory  ad- 
justment of  this  case,  the  recent  General  Convention  affords  stri- 
king evidence.  On  the  last  day  of  the  session,  the  following  re- 
solution, proposed  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Stevens,  was  passed  by  the  House 
of  Delegates:  "Resolved,  that  this  House  cannot  close  its  session 
without  humbly  recording  its  fervent  gratitude  to  Almighty  God, 


21 

who  alone  maketh  men  to  be  of  one  mind,  for  the  remarkable  degree 
of  harmony  and  Christian  courtesy  which  have  marked  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Convention,  and  for  the  evidences  of  increased 
zeal  in  the  work  of  church  extension,  manifested  in  the  new  im- 
pulse given  to  missionary  labours  by  the  election  of  two  Bishops 
for  the  Pacific  border." 

The  Christian  Witness,  in  commenting  upon  the  doings  of  the 
Convention,  remarks:*  "In  view  of  what  has  been  done,  and  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  truly  Christian  feeling  which  has  been  mani- 
fested by  all  parties,  there  is  abundant  cause  for  gratitude  to  God. 
The  session  might  have  been  shorter,  but  could  hardly  have  been 
more  harmonious."  "The  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the  earnest 
and  prolonged  discussions,  in  which  the  members  were  singularly 
divided  in  their  views,  yet  almost  every  important  measure  was 
passed  with  great  unanimity,  (the  yeas  and  nays  having  been  called 
but  once  or  twice  during  the  entire  session,)  and  the  disposition 
manifested,  on  all  sides,  to  withdraw  propositions  which  met  with 
any  very  considerable  opposition,  in  order  so  to  modify  them  as  to 
render  them  more  acceptable  to  the  house,  proved  that  a  spirit  of 
peace  and  concord  was  animating  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  mem- 
bers, and  which,  we  trust,  was  none  other  than  that  divine  influ- 
ence which  was  daily  invoked." 

That  the  action  of  the  Court  at  Camden  had  very  much  to  do 
with  this  pacific  and  Christian  temper  of  the  Convention,  will 
scarcely  be  questioned.  Had  the  Court  proceeded  to  trial,  and  that 
trial  been  interrupted,  as  it  would  have  been,  by  the  session  of  the 
General  Convention,  who  can  doubt  that  the  character  of  that  Con- 
vention would  have  been  widely  different.  Is  there  not  every 
reason  to  suppose  that,  instead  of  being  remarkable  for  mutual  con- 
cession, kindly  conference,  and  fraternal  feeling,  it  would  have  been 
equally  remarkable  for  strife  and  acrimony.  Greatly  was  it  to  be 
apprehended  that  the  bonds  of  Christian  fellowship  and  brotherly 
love  would  have  been  so  violently  ruptured  as  scarce  to  admit  of 
being  reunited,  and  that  the  session  would  have  been  occupied  with 
irritating  and  discordant  debates,  upon  what  would  probably  have 
been  the  most  engrossing  subject  before  them.  That  the  concilia- 
tory spirit  which  animated  the  last  Convention  will  continue  to  shed 
its  influence  over  the  Church,  is  earnestly  to  be  desired.  Even  if 
differences  of  opinion  continue  as  broad  as  ever,  it  is  exceeding 
gain  to  be  able  to  meet  and  discuss  them  in  the  spirit  of  harmony 

*  Witness  of  November  4,  1853. 


22 

and  mutual  respect,  and  for  members  of  the  same  Communion  to 
take  counsel  together  as  brethren  upon  the  great  interests  of  the 
Church  of  Christ. 

The  undersigned  has  sought,  by  the  above  imperfect  remarks, 
to  present  the  view  of  this  painful  and  perplexing  case  under 
which  he  himself  acted,  and  which  he  has  not  since  seen  cause  ma- 
terially to  change*  If  he  could  think  that  the  benefits  anticipated 
from  the  decision  have  been  purchased,  or  the  apprehended  evils 
of  a  different  course  averted,  by  the  sacrifice  of  principle,  or  the 
preference  of  expediency  to  right,  he  would  most  deeply  regret  the 
decision,  and  unite  in  pronouncing  its  condemnation.  The  late 
Episcopal  Court,  composed  of  frail  and  fallible  men,  may  have  erred ; 
if  so,  time,  the  certain  revealer  of  truth,  will  make  manifest  their 
error.  But  it  is  firmly  believed  that,  in  such  event,  it  will  also 
discover  that  the  error  was  not  inconsistent  with  honesty  of  pur- 
pose, and  anxiety  faithfully  to  discharge  the  important  trust  con- 
fided to  them.  Their  aim  was  so  to  minister  discipline,  as  to  forget 
not  mercy;  to  promote  the  repentance  of  an  accused  brother,  ra- 
ther than  contribute  to  his  ruin;  and,  without  compromising  truth 
and  righteousness,  to  "follow  the  things  which  make  for  peace." 
Whether  in  this  attempt  they  were  justifiable,  or  whether  they 
have  been  successful,  must  be  for  others  than  themselves  to  deter- 
mine. 

ALFRED  LEE. 


THE  END. 


